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by Dan Goyder
Dan Goyder reviews the history of the Monoplies and Mergers 
Commission from its beginnings in 1948 until its replacement on 
1 April 1999 by the new, European-law inspired, Competition 
Commission.
J ust over 50 years ago the Monopolies Commission first came into existence under the terms of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948. On 1 April 
this year the same Commission (though now under a different 
name) ceased to exist as a result of the terms of the 1998 
Competition Act and is replaced by the Competition Commission. 
In one sense that date, 1 April 1999, marks the death of the 
present MMC, although in reality it will continue under its new- 
name into a future in some ways different as a result of the 1998 
Act. The end of the MMC, therefore, is not really a 'death' at all, 
although it represents the start of a new stage in its existence.
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW
Competition law is different from many other areas of 
commercial law in that it is implemented mainly by 
governmental bodies such as Directorate General IV ('DG4') of 
the European Commission in Brussels and the OFT and MMC 
in London, together with the national competition authorities in 
other member states. It is only enforced to a limited extent by 
actions between persons or undertakings in national or 
Community courts. The fact that implementation therefore so 
much depends on governmental institutions emphasises the 
importance of understanding how these institutions actually 
operate. Often these authorities operate through a requirement 
(or option) of notification or registration of agreements or 
proposed transactions, and clearance or exemption has to be 
obtained with or without conditions. These contacts olten 
represent the routine aspects of the work of such authorities. 
Alternatively, contact with such agencies results from unilateral 
action on their part, as they respond to complaints or press 
reports about alleged price-fixing or market-sharing agreements 
between competitors. Investigations may then start to ascertain 
il there is evidence of such activities, often involving theo
well-known 'dawn raids', at present only available to the 
European Commission and shortly to be available, to the Office 
of Fair Trading, under the 1998 Competition Act, in respect of 
domestic UK cases.
The legal powers, traditions and resources of the institution 
will have an important part to play in the nature and 
effectiveness of the intervention which it raakes in particular 
cases. Institutions that are effectively administered and well-led 
can sometimes achieve with limited resources results that 
agencies better endowed, but suffering from bureaucratic
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rigidity, fail to match. The quality of leadership and imagination 
provided by experience amongst senior officials and their 
professional advisers is of real importance in determining both 
the outcome of individual cases and in the longer term the 
development over time of policy and policy implementation. 
Moreover, as George Yarrow pointed out in his 1998 IEA/LBS 
lecture 'MMC   retrospect and prospect':
'Institutions also have a life of their own. Once established they 
become both interest groups in their own right and a factor that 
influences later developments by changing legislative trade-offs. For 
example, when new problems arise, established institutions may gather 
powers by accretion, whether under existing legislation or as a result of 
new legislation, because their prior existence renders such accretion 
expedient in the circumstances of the time'.
This quotation has particular relevance for our present topic. 
Familiarity with the history of such governmental institutions is 
important for lawyers who are specialists in competition law and 
who need to be aware not only of the current substantive and 
procedural rules but also of the institutional characteristics of 
the bodies responsible for policy and enforcement. It is also part 
of this knowledge to be aware of the way in which the institution 
has developed over time and the various stages through which it 
has arrived at its present jurisdiction. For example, in order to 
deal effectively with officials of DG4, it is useful to realise the 
extent to which the history of the implementation by the 
European Commission of art. 85(1) and 85(3) and also of the 
Merger Regulation 4064/89 has developed over the last 40 years 
within the framework of the relevant regulations. Likewise in the 
UK, those who deal with the MMC find it helpful through 
experience to become aware of its institutional traditions, 
characteristics and methods of working, few of which by their 
very nature can be found recorded in current text books.
SEVEN PHASES OF THE MMC
To understand the operations of the MMC now it has been 
redesignated as part of the new Competition Commission, it is 
necessary to realise that it has already, in its 50 years of life, 
passed through a number of stages, in nearly all of which it had 
to react to new legislation conferring fresh jurisdiction and 
imposing different responsibilities upon it. There are seven 
separate periods that can be identified as follows.
(1) The 1948 Act up to the adoption of the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Practices (Commission) Act 1953.
(2) From 1953 until the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 
('RTPA').
(3) From 1956 until the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965.
(4) From 1965 until the Fair Trading Act 1973 (perhaps the most 
important of the various statutory interventions affecting 
the Commission's role).
(5) From 1973 to the enactment of the Competition Act 1980.
(6) From 1980 until the end of that decade (implementation of 
the European Community Merger Regulation 4064/89 and the 
first regulatory cases in which the MMC began to act to 
resolve licence disputes between regulators and the newly 
privatised utilities).
(7) The final period covers the '90s, ending on 1 April 1999 
(conversion into the Competition Commission under the 
Competition Act 1998).
From this briet outline it will be apparent that, six times out 
of seven, the beginning and end of a stage has been the result of 
a new statute which has either extended, or occasionally- 
reduced, the jurisdiction and resources allowed to the 
Commission. The first three periods, covering 16 or 17 years 
between 1948 and 1965, were not marked by expansion but 
rather by the loss of much of its original jurisdiction over 
restrictive practices as the result of the 1956 Act, even if that 
change could itself be traced directly to the Commission's own 
Collective Discrimination Report of 1955. By contrast, the last 
four periods, covering 34 years, have represented periods of 
steady expansion with one exception, the loss of jurisdiction 
over some major mergers because of the advent of the EC 
Merger Regulation from September 1990.
Early years: up to 1953
It is interesting to compare the focus of the workload and 
jurisdiction of the Commission as it has fluctuated and 
developed over the years. Taking the first period we find the 
Commission established as a plenary body, unable to sit in 
groups or chambers, so that in the first five years of its existence 
it completed only eight reports into restrictive practices and 
agreements in particular industries. There had been a number of 
sectoral reports of the same kind during the years immediately 
before the Commission was created, arising from concerns that 
wartime practices creating multiparty cartels covering prices, 
quality, terms and conditions, collective discrimination, etc., 
required examination. The idea behind the creation ol the 
Commission was to place such examination on a more 
permanent footing and to educate both industry and public on 
the problems that might be found to exist and need consequent 
intervention by government. Lack of resources, however, meant
that the preparation of reports at this time, even the relatively 
slim or light ones of those days, took two, three or even four 
years. Nevertheless the production of even a small number of 
such reports had the important result of exposing many ol the 
anti-competitive agreements that had grown up during the war 
in a wide range of industries and provided a foundation for later 
development of the Commission.
7953—56: procedural concerns about restrictive practices
The first stage of the Commission's life came to an end, 
however, in 1953 when the Conservative Government 
responded to the criticism, which had been widely expressed, 
over the inadequacy of the resources allocated to the 
Commission by strengthening it to some degree. It was allowed 
for the first time to work in groups comprising not less than five 
members and over the next three years its budget was almost 
doubled so that the annual number of reports had by 1955 
markedly increased; in 1956 we find that as many as seven were 
published. Of these the most significant was that on collective 
discrimination in 1955 which, after a broad review of a range of 
horizontal restrictive practices, put forward two alternative views 
for their future handling. However, the minority view 
(comprising three members of the Commission) proved more 
influential with the government of the day than the majority 
Report.
Interestingly, the solution that the majority wanted was a 
'prohibition' system with exemptions which, in practice, would 
have been similar to the terms of the newly implemented Treaty 
of Paris 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community. The minority who prevailed, however, wanted a 
more 'legal' system, under which particular agreements falling 
within the scope of the legislation would first be registered and 
then, if of sufficient consequence, be examined by a newly 
created division of the High Court. The state of business and 
economic opinion in this country was not yet ready for a 
'prohibition' system and in the event we have had to wait more 
than forty years for it! The arguments of the successful minority 
led to the creation of the Restrictive Practices Court, and of the 
Office of the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practice (responsible 
tor keeping a list of registered agreements and sending them on . 
a regular basis to the Court for examination in the context of the 
complex system of 'gateways'). It is clear from contemporary 
documents, however, that the Lord Chancellor and the judges 
were extremely concerned about the possibility that they might 
have to make complex economic policy judgements in such cases 
and insisted that the criteria upon which such agreements would 
be assessed be laid down in great detail to prevent the Restrictive 
Practices Court from having too wide a discretion.
SEVEN 'LIVES'
To understand the operations of the MMC now it has been 
redesignated as part of the new Competition Commission, it is 
necessary to realise that it has already, in its 50 years of life, passed 
through a number of stages, in nearly all of which it had to react to 
new legislation conferring fresh jurisdiction and imposing different 
responsibilities upon it.
7956—65: downs ... and ups
The third period begins with the enactment of the RTPA in 
1956. The first ten years of the Act were a success story,
primarily because of the proactive steps taken by judges such as 
Devlin I in the Restrictive Practices Court, which found against
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many of the agreements taken before them and changed theJ o o
original expectation that only a minority of such agreements 
would be struck down. Within fifteen years the Court had 
completely changed the landscape and nearly all horizontal 
agreements restraining competition within the UK had either 
'gone to ground' or been eliminated. By contrast, however, the 
success of this new judicial process was damaging for the 
continuing \vork of the Commission. The 1953 Act had been 
repealed, the size of the Commission reduced and its ability to 
work in chambers or groups again removed. Very few referrals 
were made and indeed during the whole period from 1957 to 
1965 only six Commission reports were published. In some four 
of those nine years it signed no reports at all. Its jurisdiction was 
now limited to investigations into major monopolies. Such a 
limited jurisdiction is inadequate in practice to sustain the 
existence of a competition authority dependent for its 
continuing vitality on a sufficient workload to ensure that it 
attracts members of the required ability and sufficient 
experience to invigorate its inquiries. If ever the Commission 
came near to premature death, this was the time.
CHANGING ROLES IN THE '90s
... the 19'89 EC Merger Regulation (4064/89) ... for the first time took 
away to Brussels mergers reaching the substantial turnover threshold 
required tor 'concentrations with a Community dimension' ... The loss 
of workload in this area was to be more than compensated, however, 
by the increase in numbers of the new 'regulatory' sector licence- 
dispute cases coming before the Commission, as well as the number of 
mergers involving utility sectors ...
1965—73: new jurisdiction over mergers
However 'the darkest hour comes before the dawn' and in 
1965 the Conservative Government, fresh from a successful 
battle to outlaw resale price maintenance, responded to the 
public outcry over the proposed takeover by ICI for Courtaulds, 
without any possibility of public review of its impact on 
competition, by the introduction of a Monopolies and Mergers 
Bill. Ultimately the Act was passed in 1965 by the new Labour 
Government but in a form largely framed by the previous 
Conservative administration. In giving this new jurisdiction to 
the Commission, its size, budget and flexibility of working within 
groups was also restored and for the first time services were 
brought within its scope in addition to goods. The criteria for 
the assessment of mergers were at this time to be the same as 
those laid down in 1948 for assessment of monopoly, namely a 
rather narrow public interest test. However, if a public interest 
finding was made in respect of any merger, the Secretary of State 
retained discretion to decide on the final outcome of the case 
without necessarily being required to accept the 
recommendations of the MMC. On the other hand if the 
Commission made a finding that there was no public interest 
detriment from the proposed merger, the Secretary of State 
could not intervene and the merger would go through.
During the period between 1965 and 1973 it is noticeable 
that the Commission becomes significantly more active, and that 
the Board of Trade is willing to make more significant references 
to it. We find sectors referred in which MMC findings will in due
course have an important effect on both their structure and 
development. These include the first supply of beer reference 
and other references in petrol and film processing as well as 
general reports on particular practices, such as refusal to supply. 
The MMC issued its first merger reports at the end of the '60s 
and, by chance, the two principal initial cases both involved 
conglomerate mergers (Unilever/Allied Breweries and Rank/De 
la Rue), which enabled general comments on the public interest 
aspect of such transactions to be spelled out in its reports.
1973-80: the Fair Trading Act
1973 and the beginning of the fifth period marks a real 
watershed in the history of the Commission. It is, of course, also 
the year in which the UK joined the European Community, a 
decision which itself would in time have a major influence on 
our competition law and institutions, not excluding the MMC. 
The Fair Trading Act 1973, introducing a new regime both for 
competition and consumer law, is still with us in spite of some 
minor subsequent amendments. The Act consolidated the law in 
respect of both monopoly and merger inquiries to be made by 
the MMC, conferred the current title of 'Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission' upon it for the first time and created the 
Office of the Director General of Fair Trading, responsible both 
for administering the existing restrictive trade practice legislationo o r o
and also for all aspects of competition policy as well as consumer 
protection. '
The Commission now began to operate within the tripartite 
system familiar to us (Secretary of State   OFT   MMC) and, 
because of the existence of more adequate machinery for 
examining complaints and analysing the need for inquiries, 
began to receive a more consistently important stream of 
references made on solid competition grounds rather than on 
the more opportunistic basis of earlier years. The threshold for 
investigation of both monopoly and merger cases was lowered in 
the 1973 Act from the original one-third of the relevant UK 
market to one quarter; the expanded 'public interest criteria' set 
out in the new s. 84 (replacing that in the 1948 Act) gave a wider 
measure of discretion in both the initial choice of references and 
the detailed assessment of them to the OFT and thereafter the 
MMC. The relevant criteria included not only the maintenance 
of competition but also the protection of consumers, the 
maintenance of a balanced distribution of industry in the UK 
and also the promotion of new products and technology. The 
influence of a powerful Director General of Fair Trading, 
Gordon Borrie, also began to be felt soon after his appointment 
in 1976. Major inquiries in this fifth period include important 
retail and consumer sectors as well as many professional services 
reports. Among the sectors examined were frozen foods, cat and 
dog foods and ice cream, contraceptive sheaths and ceramic 
sanitary ware.
7980—89: Competition Act gives new powers
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Liesner Committee was 
established by the Board of Trade to report on the best method 
of investigating and controlling both monopoly practices and 
merger cases as well as the working of the restrictive trade 
practices system. The main need identified by the Liesner 
Committee was the absence of any measure dealing with single, 
firm, anti-competitive practices; to meet this need, the 
Competition Act 1980 was one of the first measures adopted by the
new Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher, and 
the sixth stage in the Commission's life began. The anti-
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competitive practice jurisdiction of the Commission was 
dependent, however, on a prior examination of the particular 
practice by the Office of Fair Trading resulting in an adverse 
finding against the company; the apparent difficulty of 
identifying significant anti-competitive practices by a single 
company meant this jurisdiction never really took off and dealt 
mainly with only minor cases.
The 1980 Act, however, had its main impact in another area, 
under s. 11 , which provided that the Commission could carry 
out so-called 'efficiency studies' into public authorities and 
bodies not subject to normal competitive pressures, for example 
the Central Electricity Generating Board, water and sewerage 
authorities, British Rail, the nationalised coal and steel 
industries, etc. The Conservative Government had thus given to 
the MMC some of the jurisdiction previously held by the Prices 
and Incomes Commission, which it had abolished upon coming 
to power. The section unexpectedly produced a large number of 
cases and laid the foundation for MMC's subsequent 
involvement in utility licence disputes. Such public sector 
inquiries were regarded generally as successful, in that they 
substantially increased knowledge of the working of these 
industries, the majority of which were to pass over the next few 
years into private ownership, and established the ability of the 
MMC to handle this kind of inquiry alongside its traditional role 
in assessing competition and monopoly in the private sector. 
Throughout the 1980s, therefore, with these multiple forms of 
inquiry, the MMC was kept extremely busy and the number of 
reports published annually grew considerably.
1989-99: changing roles
This period, however, came to an end with the 1989 EC 
Merger Regulation (4064/89), which for the first time took away 
to Brussels mergers reaching the substantial turnover threshold
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required for 'concentrations with a Community dimension' and 
thereby reduced the number of merger cases dealt with by the 
MMC. The loss of workload in this area was to be more than 
compensated, however, by the increase in numbers of the new 
'regulatory' sector licence-dispute cases coming before the 
Commission, as well as the number of mergers involving utility 
sectors, in particular water and electricity, which raised new and 
difficult issues. The original model of legislation authorising 
intervention by the MMC if the privatised utility was unable to 
agree the terms of licence amendments with its regulator is 
contained in the Telecommunications Act 1984, but this has served 
as a model for other later privatisation statutes and the number 
of cases in this area has grown steadily up to the present. They 
have ranged from cases involving major structural issues such as 
the British Gas inquiry in 1993 to relatively minor inquiries such 
as the 'Chat lines (BT)' case at the end of the '80s.
This, therefore, is the position that prevailed prior to the 
enactment of the 1998 Competition Act. As of 1 April 1999, the 
MMC was technically 'dissolved' under s. 45(3) and its functions 
were transferred to the new Competition Commission. The 
immediate eflect of its dissolution however is that it becomes the 
reporting side of the new Competition Commission, cohabiting 
with the new Appeal Tribunal, which will be responsible under 
s. 46 of the Act for hearing any appeals against decisions of the 
DGFT in respect of Chap. 1 and 2 of the Act. The small print
governing the constitution of the new Commission is found in 
Sch. 7. It is interesting to note that it will have a Management
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Board known as the 'Competition Commission Council' upon 
which the Chairman of the reporting side (Derek Morris) and 
the President of the Appeal Tribunal (Judge Christopher 
Bellamy) will both sit with other members of the Council to 
ensure coordination of all its activities. Both the tribunal and the 
'reporting side' will be bound by the provisions of the 
Competition Act and in particular by s. 60, which contains the 
well known 'guiding principles' clause requiring that decisions 
are made under UK domestic competition law in a manner 
consistent with equivalent decisions under EC competition law.
This is a major change of approach for UK Competition law, 
though one welcomed by the great majority of politicians, 
professionals and commentators. It will mean changes in due1 o
course in the approach of the Competition Commission's 
reporting side but I think it will prove able to take this in its 
stride. One of the features of the MMC in the past has been its 
ability to adapt to new circumstances and to take on new 
responsibilities in a flexible and constructive way. This has been 
true both of its merger jurisdiction and of its efficiency studies 
into public utilities under s. 11 of the 1980 Act as indeed also of 
its willingness to tackle the complex and burdensome utility 
licence appeals which it has taken on from the beginning of the 
present decade.
CONCLUSION
Over its lifetime, therefore, the MMC has suffered various 
vicissitudes and changes. I am clearly not an unbiased 
commentator, but I think it has shown over this time certain 
particularly British qualities which have been of real value in the 
investigation of a wide variety of references, even within a system 
which leaves it unable to make policy initiatives of its own but is 
rather required to make the best use of the opportunities which 
successive Director Generals of Fair Trading and other regulators 
have enabled it to receive. Within this framework the MMC has 
contributed much to our understanding of how business ando
industry operates in both the public and private sectors. It has 
also contributed much to the control of monopoly power and 
encouragement of competition In particular, it has demonstrated 
certain features and characteristics that are central to such 
control, among which I would mention especially:
  independence both from authorities and government itself;
  a thoroughness in analysis and approach aided by the use of 
proper professional skills and techniques;
  transparency through production of full reports available for 
publication with deletion only of business secrets; and
  a general consistency in its approach over time especially in its 
regulatory cases.
I am certain that it will continue to show the same adaptability 
in the future as it has in the past. ©
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